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What is the Impact of Food Stamps on Prices and Products
Variety? The Importance of the Supply Response
By XAVIER JARAVEL, LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS∗
Do supply dynamics alter the cost-benefit
analysis of government transfer programs? Con-
ceptually, government transfers can affect the
relative size of different product markets by
redistributing purchasing power across income
groups with different preferences or by encour-
aging the purchase of specific products. Theo-
retically, transfers increasing demand in a mar-
ket could lead to either higher or lower prices
in this market in general equilibrium. In a stan-
dard perfect competition environment with in-
creasing marginal cost of production, increased
demand should lead to higher prices because the
supply curve slopes upward. But with monop-
olistic or oligopolistic competition, higher de-
mand can lead to lower prices because a larger
market size induces innovations, entry of more
productive suppliers, and lower markups via in-
creased competition.1
This paper examines this question empirically
in the context of a transfer program in the United
States providing benefits to low-income house-
holds to help pay for the cost of food. The Sup-
plemental Nutrition Assistance Program, pop-
ularly known as the food stamp program, cost
over 70 billion in fiscal year 2016 and provided
over 40 million Americans (14% of the popu-
lation) with an average of $125 per person per
month. Hastings and Washington (2010) docu-
ment that stores increase prices on the specific
days when food stamp recipients receive their
benefits, which characterizes the effect of food
stamps on prices in the very short run. In con-
trast, I examine the impact of changes in food
stamp enrollment on prices and product variety
over several years, thus taking into account the
∗ I thank Peter Ganong for extensive help with the food stamp
data, Mark Duggan for inspiration, as well as Jessie Handbury
and seminar participants at Harvard and Stanford for insightful
comments. Some of the results in this paper are based on data
from The Nielsen Corporation provided by the Kilts Marketing
Data Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of Busi-
ness.
1See Jaravel (2017) and the references therein for a complete
discussion of these mechanisms.
potential response of supply over the long run.
To obtain variation in food stamp transfers
plausibly orthogonal to other factors that may
affect prices and product variety, I use varia-
tion in state policies that were implemented be-
tween 2001 and 2007 and made it easier to apply
and continue receiving food stamps. As shown
by Ganong and Liebman (2017), these policies
had a large impact on the take-up rate for food
stamps and their implementation across states
was not correlated with economic fundamentals
such as unemployment.
This research design delivers three results.
First, I find that food stamp eligible households
experienced relatively lower inflation in states
with a larger increase in the take-up rate for
food stamps, compared with ineligible house-
holds. To assuage potential identification con-
cerns, I show that (i) the negative relationship
between inflation and changes in take-up is en-
tirely driven by food product groups with strong
local brands, which is consistent with the notion
that the pattern results from changes in local de-
mand induced by food stamps; (ii) there is no ef-
fect when comparing households in other ranges
of the income distribution, such as the middle
class relative to high-income households, who
are all ineligible; (iii) the results are robust to in-
troducing controls such as unemployment, em-
ployment growth and population. The second
finding of the paper is that food stamp eligi-
ble households experienced a higher increase in
product variety in states with a larger increase in
take-up. These states are also characterized by
a faster decline in retailer margins, which is the
third result of the analysis.
I. Sample and Variable Definitions
The analysis is based on three data sources:
data on changes in the take-up rate for food
stamps between 2001 and 2007 from Ganong
and Liebman (2017); scanner data from The
Nielsen Corporation; and data on retailer mar-
1
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gins for a subset of products in the scanner data.
The number of people on food stamps de-
pends on enrollment procedures which are partly
set by states, although food stamps are a federal
program. Ganong and Liebman (2017) show
that significant variation in the take-up rate for
food stamps between 2001 and 2007 came from
the introduction of various state-level policies,
which made it easier to enroll and continue re-
ceiving benefits, for instance with the introduc-
tion of simplified reporting, shorter recertifica-
tion lengths, and interview waivers. Differ-
ent states adopted different policies, generating
variation in take-up. From 2001 to 2007, the av-
erage increase in take-up was 10.62 percentage
points, with a standard deviation of 6.33 percent-
age points across states.
To measure the response of prices and prod-
uct variety, I use the Homescan Consumer Panel
dataset from The Nielsen Corporation from
2004 to 2008, which provides barcode-level
price data for 125 product groups covering food,
alcohol, health and beauty, household supplies
and general merchandize in 49 states.2 I build a
proxy for food stamp eligibility based on house-
hold annual income and household size; using
this proxy,3 the average share of eligible house-
holds in overall spending in the scanner data
is 18.64%, with a standard deviation of 4.93%
across states.
I measure inflation on continued goods (avail-
able across consecutive years) using a CES exact
price index, repeating the procedure separately
for eligible and ineligible household groups in
each state. While inflation for non-eligible
households was on average 2.57% per year, it
was 62 basis points higher for eligible house-
holds (Online Appendix Figure A1 reports the
distribution of inflation rates across states and
groups).
Next, I measure changes in product variety
following Feenstra (1994). For each eligibility
group, I compute the share of spending in year
22004 is the earliest year for which the data is available. Con-
ceptually, starting to measure prices and product variety later
than the first year of introduction of the policies (2001) may
be desirable because these policies are implemented gradually
across states and it may take a few years for suppliers to start
responding.
3In fact, food stamp eligibility is primarily determined by a
household’s monthly income and its size; eligibility also depends
on additional factors which are not measured in the Nielsen data,
such as assets.
t on goods that are new relative to t − 1 (sNt )
and the share of spending in year t−1 on goods
that were discontinued in year t (sDt−1).
4 The
change in product variety between t−1 and t is
given by sNt − sDt−1. Repeating the procedure for
each eligibility group in each state, I find that
the average yearly increase in product variety
was 1.03 percentage points larger for ineligible
households.
Finally, I measure retailer gross margins for a
subsample of barcodes for which data is avail-
able on both consumer prices p and wholesale
costs cw in 20 states. The gross margin is de-
fined as p−cwp and the average margin is 44.19%.
II. The Price Effects of Food Stamps
This section presents the main result of the pa-
per, the impact of changes in take-up for food
stamps across states on inflation for eligible
households.
As previously mentioned, the change in food
stamp take-up rates varied substantially across
states, as different states adopted different en-
rollment policies (Ganong and Liebman (2017)).
These policies generated variation in purchas-
ing power for food products at the bottom of
the income distribution, in a way that may be
orthogonal to price dynamics across the prod-
uct space and across states. To test this iden-
tification assumption, I implement three falsifi-
cation tests. First, although in principle recipi-
ents could treat food stamps as fungible income,
Hastings and Shapiro (2017) show that in prac-
tice the marginal propensity to spend food stamp
benefits on food products is much higher than on
other products; therefore, if there is an effect it
should exist primarily for food products. Sec-
ond, many products are partly non-tradable be-
cause of the strength of local brand preferences.
The strength of local brand preferences varies
across product groups and inflation should re-
spond to changes in local market size induced
by food stamps primarily in product groups for
4A given barcode in a given state is defined as “new” in year
t if nobody in that state purchased it in year t− 1 (likewise for
discontinued products). An alternative is to define a product as
“new” for a given eligibility group if nobody in this group pur-
chased in year t, but this would introduce measurement error be-
cause of the uneven sizes of eligibility groups across states, as
pointed out in a different context by Handbury and Weinstein
(2014).
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which brand preferences are more local.5 Third,
a similar analysis can be conducted for ineli-
gible households of different income levels to
check that the inflation patterns are specific to
the recipient population and not a broader fea-
ture of inflation across the income distribution.
Conceptually, these three tests use subsamples
or outcomes for which I expect to find no effect
if the identification assumption is valid.
I compare the difference inflation rates of eli-
gible and ineligible households by estimating
(1) piEsi −pi Isi = β∆τs+αi+ εs,
where s indexes states, i product groups, piE/Isi
is the average CES inflation rate for eligi-
ble/ineligible households in product group i be-
tween 2004 and 2008, ∆τs is the change in take-
up between 2001 and 2007, and αi is a product
group fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered
by states.
The results are reported in Table 1. Panel A
shows that inflation is lower for eligible house-
holds in states with a higher increase in take-up
(column 1); as expected, the share of eligible
households in total spending is larger in those
states (column 2). Panel B shows that the ef-
fect is entirely driven by food product groups
with stronger local preferences. The regres-
sion coefficients are precisely estimated zeros
for non-food products or food product groups
with stronger national preferences. In contrast,
the effect is large for food products with local
preferences: a 10 percentage point increase in
take-up (the average change across states in this
period) leads to a 19.8 basis points fall in in-
flation for eligible households, which is about a
third of the overall inflation gap between eligible
and ineligible households.
The Online Appendix shows the robustness of
these results. Online Appendix Figure A2 de-
picts the main result graphically. Online Ap-
pendix Table A1 shows robustness to the intro-
duction of controls such as unemployment and
employment growth (Panel A) and reports that
the inflation difference between other income
groups is a precisely estimated zero in all parts
of the product space (Panel B). Therefore, if
5To identify product groups with stronger local brand prefer-
ences, I use a random effects model as in Jaravel (2017). See the
Online Appendix for a complete discussion.
omitted variables drive the results in Table 1,
they would have to be specific to food prod-
ucts with strong local brands, not strongly cor-
related with employment dynamics, and specific
to households that are eligible for food stamps.
III. Mechanisms
This section investigates two channels that
may explain the fall in prices in response to
increasing demand from food stamp recipients:
increasing product variety and a fall in retailer
margins. Both of these mechanisms were em-
phasized in Jaravel (2017) when studying the re-
sponse of supply to changes in the income dis-
tribution over time.
Table 2 reports the results for changes prod-
uct variety. I run a specification analogous to
(1) with the difference in the rate of increase
in product varity across eligible and ineligible
households as the outcome (using the measure
defined in Section I). Product variety increases
more for eligible households relative to ineligi-
ble households in states with a larger increase in
take-up. The effect is driven by food products
(column 2) and product groups with stronger lo-
cal preferences (column 4). A 10 percentage
point increase in take-up leads to a 14.3 ba-
sis point increase in product variety for eligible
households, close to 15% of the overall gap in
increasing product variety between eligible and
ineligible groups. A faster increase in product
variety for eligible households has a direct effect
on cost-of-living through love of variety, as well
as a potential indirect effect through margins for
continued products via increased competition.
Table 3 documents the response of retailer
margins. I run a specification analogous to (1)
at the barcode level, with retailer margin as the
outcome. For a 10 percentage point increase in
take-up, retailer margins fall by 28 basis points
on average (column 1) and this effect is en-
tirely driven by food products (columns 2 and
3). These large effects indicate that it is plau-
sible for increased competition (induced by ad-
ditional entry) to generate the fall in prices for
eligible households documented in Table 1.6
6The comparison of the estimates in Tables 1 and 3 is imper-
fect, because retailer margins are observed in a sample with only
20 states and without information on customer income; but one
can see that the estimates in these tables are similar in magni-
tudes.
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IV. Conclusion
This paper documented the effect of expand-
ing food stamp enrollment on prices and product
variety over the long-run (several years). There
are substantial declines in prices and increases
in product variety for eligible households when
enrollment (and thus demand) increases, which
strengthens the impact of food stamp expansions
on the welfare of eligible households. There-
fore the long-run supply response to changes in
demand from food stamp recipients has a first-
order impact on the cost-benefit analysis of the
program. Extending the analysis to other gov-
ernment programs and other industries is a use-
ful avenue for future work.
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TABLE 1—THE EFFECT OF CHANGES IN TAKE-UP FOR FOOD STAMPS ON INFLATION
Panel A: In Full Sample
Inflation Difference b/w Share of Eligible HH
(1) (2)
Change in take-up rate, -0.0078026* 0.206364***
2001 to 2007, pp (0.0041204) (0.0757597)
Product group fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 4,856 4,856
Panel B: In Subsamples
Inflation Difference b/w Eligible and Ineligible HH, pp
Food Product Groups Non-Food Product Groups
Local National Local National
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change in take-up rate, -0.0198453*** 0.0020867 -0.007024 -0.0097536
2001 to 2007, pp (0.0055633) (0.0065311) (0.0085525) (0.0135336)
Product group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,074 1,786 1,160 787
Notes: This table presents the results from specification (1). In both panels, each observation is at the level of product groups by state
and all regressions use spending weights. The inflation difference is the average annual difference from 2004 to 2008 between
eligibility groups. In Panel B, local and national product groups are defined based on the estimates of the random effects model
presented in the Online Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by state. *p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
TABLE 2—THE EFFECT OF CHANGES IN TAKE-UP FOR FOOD STAMPS ON PRODUCT VARIETY
Differential Change in Product Variety b/w Eligible and Ineligible HH, pp
Full Sample Food Non-Food Local National
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Change in take-up rate, 0.0089079* 0.0143542*** -0.0046595 0.0105038* 0.007025
2001 to 2007, pp (0.0049189) (0.0048838) (0.011482) (0.0058191) (0.0061231)
Product group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,997 1,979 1,018 1,228 1,731
Notes: This table presents the results from specification (1) with the average change in product variety between 2004 and 2008,
differenced across eligibility groups, as the outcome. Each observation is at the level of product groups by state and all regressions use
spending weights. In columns (4) and (5), local and national product groups are defined based on the estimates of the random effects
model presented in the Online Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by state. *p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
TABLE 3—THE EFFECT OF CHANGES IN TAKE-UP FOR FOOD STAMPS ON RETAILER GROSS MARGINS
Change in Retailer Gross Margins, pp
Full Sample Food Non-Food
(1) (2) (3)
Change in take-up rate, -0.0289324*** -0.0391377*** 0.0106899
2001 to 2007, pp (0.0117693) (0.0146433 ) (0.0290296)
Product group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,734,840 4,488,368 1,246,472
Notes: This table presents the results from specification (1) with the change in retailer gross margin between 2004 and 2007 as the
outcome. Each observation is a barcode by store by year and all regressions use spending weights. Standard errors are clustered by
state. *p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
